

# WAR AND GENOCIDAL KILLING\*

by

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- Add discussion of unintended killings. eg: disease, warwaks, etc.
- Delete use of #'s that are controversial estimates.

## WAR AND GENOCIDAL KILLING

### INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of a larger work-in-progress on the history and the sociology of genocidal killing. Our attempt, which has already undergone several reformulations, is by no means a final one; but it does represent our current thinking. In using an historical and comparative approach, our interest is focused on the attempt to identify the social conditions and situations in which genocide can and cannot occur. To identify the relevant parameters is a first step in efforts to prevent future genocides. *much too deterministic*

The relationship between war and genocide is one of those mysteries that endures first of all because very few persons have thought it worth while to explore it. Whereas scholars have thought about war for hundreds of years, genocide is a much newer field for academic research, even if its practice is as old as war itself in human history.

### THE DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE

The term "genocide," although coined in 1944, acquired its most widely accepted meaning as a result of the many political compromises that had to be agreed to in order that the United Nations could pass the CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE in 1948 (Kuper, 1981). The heart of the Genocide Convention is found in Article II, which reads:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The Convention has been widely accepted and incorporated into



much of the relevant literature and into the legal codes of many signatory countries. At the same time, this definition of genocide has been seriously questioned because it only protects groups that are specifically covered by it and because it is unsatisfactory for purposes of research and comparative analysis (Drost). We are particularly critical of the omission of political and social groups from the U.N. definition, largely at the insistence of the Soviet Union and its client states, and the inclusion of non-lethal measures in the list of acts constituting genocide.

Definitions and typologies are essential tools for scholars who want to group together phenomena that are in some relevant respect comparable, who want to explore the situations and conditions under which they occur, and who want to generalize about the processes leading up to them. To be useful, a definition and a typology of genocide must confront genocide as it has actually been practiced and encourage the examination of cases within much broader boundaries than the United Nations and international law currently recognize. At the same time, this must be done without muddying the waters for those who have no choice but to use the unsatisfactory U.N. definition in their present struggle against genocide.

Thus, in this paper, we shall use the term "genocide" when we are discussing the killing of the national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups presently named in the U.N. definition. But to introduce a broader, more realistic definition which lends itself to conceptual comparisons of various motives for genocide, we have developed the concept of GENOCIDAL KILLINGS, which we define as follows:

GENOCIDAL KILLINGS are a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators.

This definition excludes the non-lethal acts that are found in the U.N. definition [acts (b), (d), and (e)]. Because it leaves open the nature of the victim group, it allows the inclusion of groups that were excluded from the U.N. Convention. Further it allows the inclusion of groups that had not previously been considered under the U.N. Convention as potential victim groups (for example, the mentally-ill and the retarded, as well as homosexuals, deemed "unfit for life" by Nazi Germany, or the residents of westernized cities slaughtered and starved to death in Pol Pot's Cambodia) and other groups that have no existence outside a perpetrator's imagination (for example, so-called demonic witches murdered ~~by governments~~ during the Great Witch-Hunt and "wreckers" and "enemies of the people" in Stalin's Soviet Union).

? | <sup>casualties among</sup> ~~The killing of~~ combatant groups in warfare <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ excluded, but the one-sided killing of non-combatant groups in territory under the control of the victor is included. The deliberate destruction

why not the loser also?

use quote from  
Wall Street  
Journal!



of the culture of a group is covered by the term ETHNOCIDE. There are also cases, such as some aboriginal tribes in the Americas and in Oceania, where groups have been deliberately destroyed by settlers as a result of colonial expansion without the state or any other authority having intended to destroy them. These we shall refer to as GENOCIDAL MASSACRES.

Our definition of genocide excludes <sup>the</sup> civilian victims of aerial bombardment in belligerent states. In this we differ from Jean-Paul Sartre and Leo Kuper. Kuper writes:

*The whole statement is suspect by not even mentioning similar bombing of allied cities* I cannot accept the view that . . . the bombing, in time of war, of such civilian enemy populations as those of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Hamburg, and Dresden does not constitute genocide within the terms of the [U.N.] convention. (Kuper, 1981 and 1985)

*?* We base our dissenting position on the fact that in this age of total war belligerent states make all enemy-occupied territory part of the theater of operations regardless of the presence of civilians, who <sup>may</sup> ~~are~~ regarded as combatants so long as ~~their~~ <sup>the</sup> enemy governments control the cities in which they reside. This practice was started by the Italians and the Germans, and it became the practice of both sides in the Second World War. It seems unfair to single out the Allies for their bombings without mentioning Guernica and Warsaw, Rotterdam and Brest, and Rouen and London. *etc* On the other hand, the rules of war clearly entitle enemy civilians living in territory occupied by the victor to certain protections, including freedom from arbitrary killing, which would seem to place the Nazi killing of Jews, Gypsies, and others in a quite different category than the Allied bombings.

*nuts! ?* In taking this view, we find ourselves in agreement with Telford Taylor, who has written:

*good point* they [Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hamburg and Dresden] were certainly not "genocides" within the meaning of the Convention, which limits genocide to "acts committed with intent to destroy . . . a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." Berlin, London and Tokyo were not bombed because their inhabitants were German, English or Japanese, but because they were enemy strongholds. Accordingly, the killing ceased when the war ended and there was no longer any enemy.

#### A TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDAL KILLING

Our analysis of cases of genocidal killings will be presented in terms of the following typology:

TYPE I: GENOCIDAL KILLINGS that are committed in the building and maintaining of EMPIRES. The following three motives underlie the perpetrators' actions, one of them usually



being dominant:

- (a) to eliminate a real or potential threat,
- (b) to terrorize a real or potential enemy, or
- (c) to acquire and keep economic wealth.

TYPE II: GENOCIDAL KILLINGS that are committed in the building and maintaining of NATION STATES. The following three motives underlie the perpetrators' actions, one of them usually being dominant:

- (a) to eliminate a real or potential threat,
- (b) to terrorize a real or potential enemy, or
- (c) to implement a belief, theory, or ideology by destroying a real group, or a pseudo-group (see discussion below).

Type I and Type II genocidal killings, apart from distinguishing between perpetrators (empires vs. nation states), also represent a crucial distinction between types of victims and types of consequences for the perpetrator state. The victim groups in Type I are always groups outside the perpetrator's state, while the victim groups in Type II are usually within the perpetrator's state (Nazi Germany being a notable exception in that it victimized groups in its occupied territories as well). The consequences of genocidal killings of Type I were that the perpetrator realized significant material benefits from his actions, while the consequences of Type II were that the implementation of the perpetrator's belief system was only achieved at the cost to the perpetrator of enormous direct and indirect losses in human capital, losses that had grave short and long-term results for the state and the nation.

*not only -  
I still do not  
agree!!*

## HISTORY

The first genocidal killing is lost in Antiquity. It seems improbable that any occurred when people were still nomads, if only because there were so few of them and they were very thinly scattered over large territories. After the invention of agriculture, serious warfare occurred when nomads raided settled communities to benefit from their harvest. But this did not usually lead to any large scale killing because the nomads were interested in repeating their raids. The settled people may have had better motives, but usually lacked the means to destroy the nomads.

When agricultural methods improved, especially with the invention of irrigation, and produced surpluses large enough to support city states, wars over scarce resources became more frequent. Given the methods of the day, they were rarely conclusive. The defeated party would withdraw to lick its wounds, to rebuild its resources, and to seek revenge in renewed warfare. Finally someone decided -- we do not know who -- to put an end to this by destroying the defeated enemy, not only their army and weapons, but also their women, their children, their old, and their sick. This was the first of many genocidal killings.



We only have indirect evidence to support this assertion, and it is of two kinds: (1) a large number of peoples in the Fertile Crescent seem to have disappeared without leaving evidence on how they disappeared, e.g.: Amorites, Aramaeans, Cimmerians, Elamites, Kassites, Lulubaeans, Mittani, Hittites, Lydians, Parthians, Sumerians, Urartus, among others. Some of them were sold into slavery, some of them assimilated, some of them migrated, but some of them were almost certainly destroyed by killing; (2) the Old Testament description of cases where a people, including women and children, were slain, as in the case of the Amalekites, does not leave the reader with the impression that this was a previously unknown phenomenon. These cases from Antiquity seem to have been committed primarily in order to eliminate a present or future threat and thus would come under our Type I.a. At the same time, the perpetrators would produce terror among other peoples that were real or potential rivals. Since the people that are terrorized and the people that are destroyed are not the same, both motives can coexist. The Roman destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. is probably the most famous later example of a genocidal killing to eliminate a real or potential threat, but the Romans were also interested in terrorizing their real or potential enemies. A successful destruction also means that the property and wealth of the victims is acquired by the perpetrators. Because all three motives are thus present in almost all cases, we are treating them as sub-types. In assigning concrete cases to one of the sub-types it is necessary to decide which of the three motives played a dominant role.

Although the first Type I genocidal killings were aimed at the elimination of a real or potential threat, many of the later genocidal killings had the spread of terror (Type I.b) as their major objective. There is a striking parallel between the cases of Melos (416 B.C.), Jerusalem (73 A.D.), the victims of the Mongols (13th century), and of Shaka Zulu in southern Africa (1818-1828). In each case, the perpetrator sought to demonstrate to other real or potential enemies that the price of resistance or rebellion was the destruction of the offending group. Europe's expansion into the Americas, Asia, and Africa produced a number of genocidal killings intended to acquire and keep economic wealth (Type I.c), usually in the form of land. There are strong similarities between the fate of the Pequots of New England (1637), several of the Indian tribes of Virginia (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and the Hereros of South West Africa (1904-1907). In contrast, little evidence of genocidal killings exists in the early South American mines and plantations, where Europeans needed a large labour supply.

*However, large-scale unintended killings did occur.*

Very extensive killings resulted from European expansion when frontier settlers embarked on campaigns to destroy the native occupants of the land. Such devastations were often opposed by governments, but their feeble efforts to protect the natives were overwhelmed by the settlers' persistent attempts to annihilate their aboriginal neighbours. These were cases of genocidal massacre. Among its victims were the Caribs, the Tasmanians, the Beothuks of Newfoundland, several Indian tribes of California, and some of the tribes of the Brazilian Amazon. However, a

*+ Assyria*



far larger number of natives were the victims of disease, devastation of their environment, alcohol, and forced labour under lethal conditions.

Although Type II genocidal killings are a modern phenomenon perpetrated by nation-states, many of the methods used were developed during two transitional cases that happened long ago.

*prestigious?* The Cathars were a heretical group in the Languedoc in the twelfth and thirteenth century that gained widespread support not only among the common people, but also among the aristocracy, especially at the court of the Count of Toulouse. After vain efforts to preach to them, the Pope called for a crusade that became known as the Albigensian Crusade. This transitional case connects our two types, because from the point of view of the King of France it was an opportunity to expand his realm, while from the point of view of the Pope it was necessary to eliminate heretics who did not recognize his authority. This case is also important because persecution by torture, forced confessions, and guilt by association, leading to imprisonment and death, have become standard methods in many genocidal processes of the twentieth century.

An even more important transitional case is the Great Witch-Hunt of Europe because the victim groups here were an invention of the perpetrators. Its thousands of victims were burned at the stake not as witches, but for demonic witchcraft, i.e.: for conspiracy with the devil. Many people doubted it at the time, and everybody today doubts that there ever was such a conspiracy, that a coven of witches ever met the Devil on a mountain to plot against God, or to have sexual intercourse with him. However, although neither the group nor the conspiracy it was accused of had any reality in verifiable fact, the results were real enough: the accused were burnt at the stake. This innovation in the history of genocidal killings makes it important to include in Type II.c:

- real victim groups, regardless of whether the accusations against them were true or not, and
- pseudo-groups of victims, that can be identified only after a perpetrator labels them as such.

The question arises as to why a perpetrator would invent a pseudo-group of victims when real groups are always readily at hand. Christina Larner has suggested that the victimization of a pseudo-group for a pseudo-conspiracy serves to legitimate a new regime that is trying to impose a new discipline on a recalcitrant population. A real group would not serve this purpose nearly as well because it might be able to defend itself, because it might be able to enlist the support of sympathizers, and because its victimization might thus threaten the unity of the realm. We suspect that Stalin knew exactly what he was doing when he labeled his victims "enemies of the people" and "wreckers". The research on this hypothesis remains to be done, but it is challenging in the light of the number of twentieth century



genocidal killings that have been perpetrated by new regimes against pseudo-groups that are accused of pseudo-offences.

All of the Type II genocidal killings, with the exception of some early transitional cases, occurred in the twentieth century. Among the early transitional cases, in addition to the Albigenian Crusade and the Great Witch-Hunt, were the lethal persecution of Christians in the Roman Empire, the slaughter of the non-Christian inhabitants of Antioch and Jerusalem during the Crusades and the persecutions of the Marranos and Moriscos by the Inquisition in Spain. These are all transitional cases involving religious persecution and thus have important characteristics in common with Type II.c. Other cases that fit into Type II.c are: the Armenian victims of Pan-Turkic ideology and the Jews and the Gypsies who became the victims of Nazi race theories. Victim groups who were attacked to eliminate real or perceived threats (Type II.a) include: the Communists in Indonesia, and educated and elite groups among the Hutu in Burundi and in what became Bangladesh. Finally, there are several cases where the victim groups were destroyed in order to terrorize a real or potential enemy or opposition (Type II.b): the peasantry in the Ukraine, "wreckers" and "enemies of the people" and the army and party elites during Stalin's purge years, as well as several nationality groups in the southern USSR at the end of World War II, political opponents in Equatorial Guinea, and rebellious groups in northern Ethiopia. Also in the twentieth century, isolated survivals of Type I.c cases have been reported, particularly in South America, where colonial expansion in search of resources still endangers indigenous peoples, though the colonizers have by now become nation-states with large, yet unexploited, hinterlands.

not II.c?

## THE ROLE OF WAR IN GENOCIDAL KILLING

### Type I Genocidal Killings

There is a most important connection between war and genocidal killing committed in the building and maintaining of empires. Virtually all the cases in Type I of our typology involve the attempt to destroy groups through war. The classic pattern of genocidal killing to eliminate a real or potential threat was <sup>probably</sup> laid down by the <sup>Babylonians or the</sup> Assyrians and brought into the western world by the Romans. Their destruction of Carthage was largely a result of fear of their old enemy's rebirth as an even more powerful military and economic rival. (Adcock, Astin, Sherwin-White) Two earlier Punic Wars convinced the leaders of the Roman state that the Third Punic War must be the last.

Baby wa?  
(see  
Saggs)  
??

The desire to instill terror in other states was a second important factor in Rome's destruction of Carthage. As a conquered state which had put itself at the mercy of Rome and refused Rome's order to abandon the shores of North Africa, Carthage must be made an example so shocking that it would discourage rebels wherever the Roman Legions ruled. Roman commanders experiencing great difficulty in recruiting satisfactory troops turned naturally to terror as a weapon in their struggle to discourage rebellion within Rome's vast empire.

Survivors were rare in genocidal killings to terrorize a real

Large-scale wide-spread knowledge of the thoroughness of mass killing was optimal



or potential enemy. Fear of total annihilation as a consequence of resistance or rebellion was crucial to the effectiveness of terror as a technique for intimidating third parties. The Mongols spared the lives of a few skilled craftsmen and only as many other survivors as were needed to spread news of their ferociousness to other cities. They spared neither women nor children. Shaka Zulu, who ruled the Zulu Kingdom from 1818 until his assassination in 1828, used genocidal killing to instill terror equally effectively in his march to empire. He conquered over 300 chiefdoms, annihilating some and fusing the members of others into one Zulu nation. In 1826, he attacked his most determined African enemies, the Ndwandwes, a nation of some 40,000 persons, ordering his soldiers to kill every last man, woman, and child. At the victorious conclusion of the war, his soldiers executed his order. (Walter, Omer-Cooper, Chanaiwa)

The destruction of the Pequots of New England, many of the Indian tribes of Virginia, and the Hereros of Southwest Africa, as well as some rare 20th century cases in Latin America, were all achieved in wars of colonial conquest with control of land and economic gain as their aim. Each devastation began when the victim group refused to surrender control of its land to settlers. Resistance led to war. In each case, the perpetrators continued to kill women and children after defeating the warriors of the tribe. The ferocity of the aborigines' resistance served as the pretext for killings intended to destroy the group, as did the natives' unconventional war tactics, both of which were invoked to buttress the rudimentary race theories that <sup>were</sup> used to justify completely annihilating the vanquished peoples rather than converting them to Christianity. As Nicholas Canny has shown, some of the theories of race prevalent in the American colonies can be traced back to the secular ideology developed by Englishmen to justify their colonization of Ireland and their slaughter of numbers of the Irish. (Canny) A much more developed theory of racial hierarchies played an important role in the devastation of the Hereros. Germany waged a colonial war against the Herero people of South West Africa (modern Namibia) from 1904 to 1907. The Germans aimed at seizing land for railroads linking German ranches with the coast. Long after the Herero warriors offered to give up, the German military commander refused to accept surrenders and turned the Hereros, including women and children, back into the desert to die of thirst and hunger. By 1911, roughly 64,000 of the 80,000 Herero people had perished.

A fairly clear pattern emerges from this review of Type I genocidal killings and war. Virtually all of the killings were highly utilitarian. The victim groups would not have been attacked if they had not fought against the loss of their territory or rebelled. In Types I.a and b., genocidal killing was actually an important and accepted part of war strategy. It was used as a tool to acquire and retain control of colonies and resources. ~~Most of~~ the victims of Type I genocidal killings were civilians who were killed shortly after the surrender or the annihilation of the armed forces defending them.



by whom These pre-modern genocidal killing were fairly simple matters. 2  
 They required only a rudimentary technology and aroused very little surprise or moral indignation at the time. Swords, spears, arrows, and fire were the lethal weapons. Ghengis Khan's killing machine, like the others, worked smoothly and efficiently without benefit of modern record keeping. Mongol commanders insured that their men fulfilled the order to spare no one by dividing the number of survivors in a city by the number of their troops and requiring each soldier to collect the requisite number of ears before ~~they were~~ <sup>he was</sup> allowed to collect booty.

Why not? Earlier we defined genocide because we assume that it is a definable form of human behavior. But it must be remembered that the very term was coined only in the middle of the twentieth century. This raises questions about the applicability of the term to earlier periods of history, and about the judgemental and moral loadings that have become attached to it.

? There seems to be no problem in applying the terms genocide and genocidal killing to those phenomena that seem to fit the definitions -- assuming the reliability of the evidence -- no matter when these phenomena occurred. A more serious problem is raised by the moral loading attached to the term in the modern era. Western liberalism, as it has developed since the Enlightenment, raises the issue of moral relativism in historical and comparative studies. Thus, we take it for granted today that we are all against genocide whenever and wherever it occurred. But this obscures our knowledge of how it was perceived by contemporaries. ?

In some societies, genocidal killing was perceived as cruel and harsh punishment, even by the standards of the day. Pierre Ducrey argues that the Peloponnesian War in which the men of the island of Melos were annihilated and the women and children enslaved was an exceptionally brutal war even by the standards of the ancient Greeks. In other societies, it was fatalistically accepted as the fate of the losers and the weak. There even were societies in which it was seen -- at least by the perpetrators -- as the just and justified outcome of previous actions. But ?  
 ? since the rise of the nation-state, it has increasingly been thought of as inconsistent with the values and attributes of a fully human society. It is this inconsistency that has resulted until recently in what we have called the COLLECTIVE DENIAL of the prevalence of genocidal events; that is, the ignoring of these events in historical reporting, or their glossing over by the use of vague or ambiguous terminology. A particular ?  
 ? problem of studying Type II genocidal killings is that most of them took place in the modern era when collective denial has often left blank pages in contemporary and historical accounts. ?  
 ? Another serious problem for researchers are dishonest denials by perpetrators of genocidal killings and their successors.



## Type II Genocidal Killings

Within Type II genocidal killings, the relationship between war and genocidal killings committed in the building and maintaining of nation-states is strongest in Type II.a., killings intended to eliminate a real or potential threat. Compared to the cases in Type I, the connections between war and genocide are minor.

Some of the cases in this category started with small armed rebellions by factions within the victim group to overthrow the dominant regime, or to achieve independence by secession. *intended to overthrow the policies of their rulers*

*No ?* The earliest example we have found is the rebellion of Japanese peasants against the Tokugawa Shogunate in the Shimabara uprising of 1637-1638. Led by Christians, it was brutally suppressed by government troops, who then killed all *the* Japanese Christians they could find. Other victim groups who were attacked to eliminate real or perceived threats were the Communists in Indonesia in 1965 and educated and elite groups in East Pakistan or Bangladesh (1971) and among the Hutu in Burundi (1972). The numbers of victims in these genocidal killings is quite large: about 500,000 killed and 200,000 jailed in Indonesia; 1.5 to 3 million killed in Bangladesh; and 100,000 to 200,000 Hutu victims in Burundi.

*?* Hardly any of the modern victims in this category were armed. Their killing took place in the context of one-sided civil strife in which the state attacked its own non-combatant citizens. *?*

*not so* War played an even less important role in genocidal killings initiated by nation-states in order to terrorize a real or potential enemy, our Type II. b. Victim groups in this category are famine victims in the Ukraine in 1932-1933, political opponents killed by Macias in Equatorial Guinea from 1969 to 1979, and Khmer Rouge party officials murdered in Democratic Kampuchea or Cambodia from 1975 to 1978. The basic aim of the perpetrator in these genocidal killings was to discourage disloyalty to the state or regime. In the case of the man-made Ukrainian famine, which killed perhaps as many as 6 million people, the genocidal killings were intended to break resistance to grain seizures and undermine the distinct culture of the 50 million or so Ukrainians. The famine was preceded by a purge of Ukrainian Communist officials who had supported the use of their language in local schools and factories and overseen a virtual national renaissance. (Mace)

By far the best known of modern genocidal killings are those intended by the perpetrator to implement a belief, theory, or ideology by destroying a real group or a pseudo-group. Although most of these genocides occurred during or in the aftermath of wars, their victims cannot be classified as casualties of war. They were civilians deliberately concentrated and killed by their own governments or the occupation governments of their regions. Moreover, most of these genocidal killings were carried out despite the burden they imposed on the perpetrators' war-making capacity.

The earliest genocide in this category was the Turkish killing of some 800,000 to 1 million Armenians, more than half the Armenian



population in Turkey, in 1915. The balance of the evidence presently available indicates that the killings were intended to fulfill the Pan-Turkic ideology of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress by ridding Turkey forever of its sizable Armenian minority. Within the boundaries of their ideology, nationalists such as Ziya Gokalp, Talaat, and Enver Pasha saw Armenians not as an ancient minority, but as aliens who did not belong among the Turks. The First World War created a lethal context for this new perception. As Robert Melson has observed:

these strangers were seen as part of a dangerous context: they were the last of the Christian minorities -- the others had seceded -- who still remained within the newly valued boundaries; there had been national stirrings among them; and in the midst of war, it was said that they favored the Russian side.

The Armenian genocide also illustrates the costs that a perpetrator is prepared to incur in order to carry out an ideological genocide. The completion of the Berlin-Baghdad railroad was considered crucial to the Central Powers' war effort. The majority of the workers on the railroad project were Armenians. In spite of management's pleading, they were deported and the railroad was not completed in time to be used during the war. (Trumpener)

The great ideological killings of Stalin were carried out in peacetime. Among these, Stalin's plan to "liquidate the kulaks as a class" and collectivize agriculture is of most interest for this paper. According to a document published in the SOCIALIST COURIER during 1930 and attributed to Kaganovich, Bauman, and the chief of the GPU, Yagoda, Stalin instructed local authorities to divide all the kulaks in their territory into three categories:

The first category was comprised of "kulaks" who actively opposed the Soviet government or were suspected of being secret counter-revolutionaries. All these "kulaks" were to be arrested and shot summarily on the order of the local authorities, without asking approval by any central authority. \* \* \*

The second group embraced the "kulaks" who regularly employed hired labor. Their entire property was ordered confiscated and . . . transferred to the collective farms. The "kulaks" themselves and members of their families were to be deported to the northern provinces to do forced labor, such as cutting roads through the taiga, drainage work, lumbering, and work in the mines.

The third group was composed of all "kulaks" not included in the first two categories. It could be stretched to include almost any peasant, for the directive refers simply to "kulaks," without taking the trouble to define the term. Peasants in this last group were

Assyrian +  
Greek  
Christians?  
what are the  
newly-valued  
boundaries.



to have all their property confiscated and to be driven out of the area with only a pair of shoes and a change of underwear in their possession. (Abramovitch)

Kulaks who were not shot were transported in miserable conditions. They were jammed into cattle cars often without food or water, usually without winter clothing or shoes, and sent in the winters of 1929-1930 and 1931-1932 to the frozen tundra of northern Russia and the Far East. They perished in vast numbers, but the government paid no attention. Yagoda insisted that the best way to fight kulaks was with bullets and an unnamed Communist official who is quoted in the SOCIALIST COURIER declared: "We must destroy five million people," in order to build socialism in the villages. Recent estimates by demographers and students of Soviet society indicate that his estimate of the number of victims may be correct. Evidence of the scale of the genocidal killings, as in the case of the Holocaust, can be seen in the enormous demand for railroad cars by the authorities concerned in the killings. Raphael Abramovitch reports that:

serious friction arose between the People's Commissariat of Railways and the GPU regarding the trains used to transport the "kulaks" to the North and the Far East. The demand for engines and railway cars for this purpose was so great that it seriously interfered with the Commissariat's transport plans and schedules. The two agencies argued and bickered for some time before they agreed on the maximum number of trains to be made available to the GPU for the transportation of its "white coal" -- the official term used in the negotiations.

It is interesting to note that in the case of the Nazis, mass genocidal killings did not begin until the start of the Second World War. The first of these killings is often ignored in conventional histories of the war. From 1939 to 1945, German psychiatrists, physicians, and scientists collaborated with the Nazis in the administrative mass killing of at least 275,000 German psychiatric patients and mentally-retarded individuals. These killings of patients deemed "unfit to live," carried out at state initiative, approved by state-appointed panels of psychiatrists, and conducted with the aid of carbon monoxide-fed gas chambers are not classified as genocide under the U.N. definition. When, by the end of 1941, the bulk of the mental patients had been murdered by the killing experts, the killing specialists were ordered to new locations in the East, where they turned their attention to the mass murder of Jews, Gypsies, and others.

In the case of the Jews, Hitler and his colleagues re-defined adherents to the Jewish religion, as well as Jewish converts to Christianity and non-practicing Jews, as members of a sub-human Jewish "race". The members of this "race" they condemned to death as participants in a world-conspiracy allegedly bent on international domination and pollution of the Germanic or Aryan



race. It was on the basis of this bogus biological definition of the victim group that Hitler over-ruled Protestant and Catholic clergymen who tried to save the lives of Jewish converts to Christianity. The religious status of his victims could not have concerned Hitler less. The Nazis killed Jews as members of a group that they invented and defined.

The effect of the Holocaust on Germany's ability to wage war requires further research, but some observations are possible. There is no doubt that by amputating the Jews of Germany from German society Hitler sacrificed some of the best scientific and industrial talents Germany possessed. The contribution to the Allied war effort of those German Jews who were able to emigrate is obvious to anyone familiar with the history of the Manhattan Project and other major breakthroughs in military technology. The burden of transporting Jews to the killing factories of eastern Europe also must be weighed in the balance. At the height of the Red Army's offensives in 1942 and 1943 Eichmann and his unit requisitioned rail cars and locomotives for transports to Chelmno, Auschwitz and Treblinka. Protests by Speer and the industrialists against the loss of valuable Jewish slave laborers were consistently over-ruled by Hitler and Himmler.

All of this may suggest that Hitler's determination to purify the world by destroying the Jews played a larger role in his move to war than is usually credited. This is a point which Norman Cohn explores in his book *WARRANT FOR GENOCIDE*. In connection with Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941, Cohn notes that:

in Hitler's eyes Russia was the country in which the Jews, through the revolution, had most completely 'infected' the population . . . . When the German attack began, Himmler announced that it was intended to kill thirty million Russians. The number of Russian dead is in fact put at twenty million; and the way in which whole armies of prisoners of war were put behind barbed wire and left to starve, and whole villages of men and women herded into barns to be burned alive, is certainly connected with the fact that these people were regarded as sub-human beings, bastardized by the Jews and enlisted in their service.

The invasion of Poland and the Soviet Union placed in Hitler's hands the bulk of Europe's Jews and Gypsies, and gave him the opportunity to fulfill what appears to have been a life-long ambition. In the final weeks of his regime, Hitler counted the Holocaust as one of his greatest achievements, declaring:

We have pierced the Jewish abscess. The world of the future will be eternally grateful to us.

And in the last words of his will, he enjoined the German nation to "merciless opposition to the world-poisoner of all peoples,



international Jewry." (Cohn)

*Def.?* The notion of a minority or a race polluting a nation-state or a master race, so important in the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, has its analogy in communist genocidal killings. Stalin's annihilation of a vast segment of the peasantry looks rather utilitarian next to the events that unfolded in Cambodia or the Kampuchean Democratic Republic from 1975 to 1978. This genocidal killing involved the state-organized murder of the residents of culturally important and westernized cities like the former royal capital of Oudong and Phnom Penh on the orders of Pol Pot and his faction within the Khmer Rouge. In spite of the fact that some four-fifths of those who were in the cities at the end of the war in Cambodia had been simple peasants before the war drove them from the countryside, they were treated as sources of counterrevolution and subversion, corrupted by their exposure to western manufactured goods and life in the urban enclaves. Khmer Rouge doctrine dictated a "cleansing" of Kampuchean life requiring the execution of dancers and musicians at the royal court, teachers, civil servants, engineers, and doctors. Francois Ponchaud does not exaggerate when he says that the Khmer Rouge intended to fulfill their ideology by starting history over at what they called "Year Zero". In the process, we now know that they killed as many as 2 million of Cambodia's 7 million ~~persons~~ *people*.

*Isn't this a red herring? Did anyone claim that war creates it?* The importance of war in the Cambodian killings is secondary to the ideology of Pol Pot and other leaders of the Khmer Rouge. While it is correct to say that the Viet Nam War gave Pol Pot his opportunity, recent studies by Ben Kiernan and Craig Etcheson indicate that his vision of a primitive Communist state was born in the student ghettos of France and China, not in the chaos of the Indo-China war. As in the case of Hitler, war gave Pol Pot the opportunity to implement his phantasy, it did not create it. Far from aiding the Khmer Rouge to retain their grip on power, their genocidal killings undermined the economy of Cambodia and gave the Vietnamese a perfect excuse for invasion and intervention.

*1.* In virtually all of the ideologically-motivated genocidal killings in Type II. c., with the possible very significant exception of the Nazi case in which genocide may have been one of Hitler's reasons for going to war, the fact of war or the threat of war simply played a facilitating role, making it easier for the perpetrator to implement his lethal ambitions. In Type II. c. genocidal killings, nothing that the victims did caused their deaths. They were neither rebels nor resistors who actively provoked their killers. In all the cases under consideration, excepting only the Armenians, the definition of the victim group was invented by the perpetrators and ruthlessly applied to everyone within that category.

*1.* Many historical studies treat wars and ideologically motivated genocidal killings as aberrant incidents outside the mainstream



of history. Yet the evidence suggests otherwise and leads one to consider that many of these killings took place during wars and in their aftermath because genocide is a crime of state and in wartime the state enjoys extraordinary powers and opportunities. Of course, none of the states we have discussed in this section were democracies, so we are really speaking about the greater powers that inhere in the leaders of genocidal states in wartime. Surely Talat and Enver Pasha, Lenin and Stalin, and Hitler and Pol Pot acquired much greater freedom from factional struggles in war than they ever enjoyed during years of peace. At the same time, they enjoyed an extra measure of loyalty and public support in war and its aftermath that was denied them in peace. Special war-engendered loyalty to the head of state may have been of particular significance in Germany, where the civil service and the railroad administration played such an important role in the implementation of the Holocaust.

### CONCLUSIONS

The argument in this paper has been that genocidal killings originated in human history as a weapon in strategies of war connected with the growth and maintenance of empire, and that in the modern era of the nation-state genocidal killings have become a major instrument for fulfilling the ideologies of states and regimes. The utilitarian element in genocidal killing has diminished, to be replaced by more subjective considerations *ideological* that encourage states to resort to genocide even when it diminishes their war-making capacity.

Investigations into the history of genocidal killings have only just begun, and are hampered by a series of daunting problems. Before we can learn more about the connections between war and genocidal killings, we shall have to deal with ~~the~~ them.

- For the early periods of human strife, we shall have to develop an archeology of genocide if we are ever to find out what happened to peoples that have disappeared.
- When evidence is available, it comes either from the victims or from the perpetrators: in the rare cases where it comes from both sides, the discrepancies are often dramatic.
- In the nature of the event under study, underreporting would be expected, but overreporting also has occurred.
- Finally, modern totalitarian regimes have developed a high degree of efficiency in controlling access to information and maintaining secrecy.

Nevertheless, research must go ahead if we are to understand the situations and conditions under which genocidal killings are likely to occur, and the processes leading up to them. Such research is not only a matter of scholarly curiosity, but is also an essential precondition for attempts at predicting and preventing genocides and genocidal killings in the future.